Difference between revisions of "Size of Committees Under Outside Influence"
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'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Abstract</span>: '''The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between source of influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with the minimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decision making as any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance of preference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probability increases with the precision of voters private signals. | '''<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Abstract</span>: '''The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between source of influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with the minimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decision making as any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance of preference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probability increases with the precision of voters private signals. | ||
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Revision as of 04:07, 28 November 2015
Working paper #SNUECON-WP2015-001
Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Peter Postl, Jaideep Roy
Abstract: The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between source of influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with the minimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decision making as any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance of preference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probability increases with the precision of voters private signals.
