Difference between revisions of "Size of Committees Under Outside Influence"
[+/-]
Widgets
Widgets<bs-widget-edit>
From SNUWIKI
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
===='''Working paper #SNUECON-WP2015-001'''==== | ===='''Working paper #SNUECON-WP2015-001'''==== | ||
===='''Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Peter Postl, Jaideep Roy'''==== | ===='''Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Peter Postl, Jaideep Roy'''==== | ||
− | |||
− | |||
'''<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Abstract</span>: '''The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between sourceof influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with theminimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decisionmakingas any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance ofpreference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probabilityincreases with the precision of voters private signals. | '''<span style="text-decoration: underline;">Abstract</span>: '''The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between sourceof influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with theminimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decisionmakingas any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance ofpreference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probabilityincreases with the precision of voters private signals. |
Revision as of 03:58, 28 November 2015
Working paper #SNUECON-WP2015-001
Saptarshi P. Ghosh, Peter Postl, Jaideep Roy
Abstract: The paper studies the impact of biased influence on the returns from increasing the sizeof a committee. We show that when the chance of preference misalignment between sourceof influence and voters is low, committee size is irrelevant and a small committee with theminimum number of just three voters generates the same probability of correct decisionmakingas any larger electorate. On the other hand, in settings with a high chance ofpreference misalignment, the smallest committee size needed to maximize this probabilityincreases with the precision of voters private signals.